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are consistent with the idea that people generally believe in the existence of free will.
Effects of Disbelief in Free Will
What if people’s belief in free will is challenged? Some scientists state that there 
is no such thing as free will either because human actions are determined by previous 
events or at random (e.g., Crick, 1994; Wegner, 2002). These statements could pose 
threats to people’s belief in free will, leading to potential changes in social judgments 
and behaviors. In line with this argument, Vohs and Schooler (2008) demonstrated that 
disbelief in free will has effects on willingness to cheat. In their second experiment, par-
ticipants read one of three statements according to their assigned condition. In the free 
will condition, the statements supported the existence of free will, whereas in the deter-
minism condition, the statements denied the existence of free will. Participants in the 
control condition read statements which are irrelevant to the existence of free will. In a 
subsequent, ostensibly unrelated task, participants completed a cognitive test and they 
were provided opportunities to overpay themselves. The dependent measure was the 
amount of money they took from the researchers. Results indicated that participants in 
the determinism condition took more money than those in the free will or control condi-
tions. These findings suggest that disbelief in free will facilitates cheating.
Baumeister, Masicampo and DeWall (2009) extended the findings of Vohs and 
Schooler (2008). In a first study, they examined the effects of disbelief in free will on 
intention to help in a hypothetical scenario. The results revealed participants in the de-
terminism condition reported less likelihood to help others than those in the free will 
or control conditions. In a third experiment, they focused on the relationship between 
free will beliefs and aggression. This experiment demonstrated that participants in the 
determinism condition served up more hot sauce to another person who they knew was 
disliking it. Taken together, the data indicate that disbelief in free will decreases helping 
and increases aggression.
Why do these changes occur? According to Baumeister et al. (2009), disbelief in 
free will functions as a prime that encourages people to respond impulsively rather than 
exerting self-control (overriding impulse for desirable behavior). That is, if people be-
lieve in the assertion that they could not choose their actions and their intentions have no 
effect on them, there would be less motivation to alter their actions so as to pursue de-
sirable results. Presumably, participants in the determinism condition were less likely to 
exert self-control, and as a result, helping was decreased and aggression was increased 
because helping and restraining aggression require self-control.
Cross-cultural Generalizability
Although research suggests that disbelief in free will contributes to less willingness 
to exert self-control, it remains unclear whether these findings can be generalized across 
cultures (almost every participant in past studies was from Western countries). As East 
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The present research aims at testing the effects of disbelief in free will on overriding impulsive decisions in Ja-
pan. Past research conducted in Western countries has found that induced disbelief in free will can weaken mo-
tivation of self-control. In the present research, the authors tested the generalizability of the findings in a study 
involving Japanese students. Results show that participants whose belief in free will was challenged reported less 
likelihood and desirability of overriding the impulsive decision. These findings suggest that some basic assump-
tions of the effects of disbelief in free will could be generalized across cultures.
Introduction
The concept of free will has been widely debated over the ages by philosophers. 
While a variety of definitions of the term “free will” have been suggested and differ-
ing opinions about this still exist (e.g., Haggard, Mele, O’Connor, & Vohs, 2010; Kane, 
2005), the free will generally defined as possessing two components of alternative possi-
bilities (the ability to choose actions from at least two options) and agency (the ability to 
cause intended actions). According to Monroe and Malle (2010), even ordinary people 
agree with this definition. They asked the participants the open-ended question, “What 
do you think it means to have free will?” and coded their responses. The results revealed 
that the most frequent responses were (a) the ability to make a decision/choice, (b) do-
ing what you want, and (c) acting without internal or external constraints. The first re-
sponse is considered to represent the concept of alternative possibility while the latter 
two responses are related to agency. In short, it seems fair to say that people think of 
free will as alternative possibility and agency.
Given that philosophers and lay people share the concept of free will, we still have 
to ask if people believe in free will as such. According to previous research, most peo-
ple do believe in free will and accept the idea that we have the abilities to choose ac-
tions among possible options and to cause intended actions. For example, Paulhus and 
Carey (2011) showed that people’s mean score is above the conceptual midpoint of the 
free will scale. In similar research, Rakos and colleagues found that people tend to agree 
with the statements that support the existence of free will, and this tendency can be at-
tributed to imprisoned adolescent and adult offenders as well (Laurene, Rakos, Tisak, 
Robichaud, & Horvath, 2011; Rakos, Laurene, Skala, & Slane, 2008). These findings 
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Free Will Belief Manipulation
Participants completed the computer-based tasks in a small room. Following several 
screens with instructions, the free will belief manipulation was introduced. Participants 
were asked to translate English sentences into Japanese according to their assigned con-
dition. Specifically, participants in the free will condition translated sentences such as 
“To be morally responsible, I have to be the ultimate source of my behavior (Dennett, 
2003).” In the control condition, participants were asked to translate sentences irrelevant 
to free will such as “Volcanoes are formed when a plate is pushed below another plate, 
or at a mid-ocean ridge or hotspot” (Mountain, 2013). Participants in the determinism 
condition translated sentences such as “The experience of conscious will comes up at 
some point after the brain has already started preparing for the action” (Wegner, 2002). 
Note that some original sentences were rewritten in order to enhance simplicity.
Positive and Negative Affects
After the free will manipulation, participants completed the Japanese version of Pos-
itive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Sato & Yasuda, 2001). The PANAS scale 
was introduced to examine the possibility that the free will manipulation affected partic-
ipants’ mood.
Self-control
Participants then read the hypothetical scenario describing an impulse purchaser. In 
the scenario, participants go out for shopping and impulsively add unnecessary but good 
looking ice cream to their shopping cart. Participants were asked to rate the likelihood 
and desirability of avoiding such an impulse purchase. Sample items were “Can you 
deny yourself ice cream in the situation?” and “Is not buying ice cream considered de-
sirable?” Participants rated the likelihood and desirability of avoiding the impulsive pur-
chase on a 5-point scale (1= not at all likely and 5 = very likely; 1= not at all desirable 
and 5 = very desirable). Responses to seven items were averaged to form the dependent 
measure of self-control (higher scores indicate more self-control). At the end of experi-
ment, participants were probed for suspicion and debriefed.
Results
Preliminary Analysis
Participants’ responses to the positive affect scale (Cronback’s α = .86), negative af-
fect scale (Cronback’s α = .84), and self-control measure (Cronback’s α = .84) were 
each highly reliable. Before testing the substantive hypothesis, we first examined the 
possible influence of the free will belief manipulation on positive and negative affect. 
As expected, the manipulation did not alter participants’ positive and negative emotions 
(F(2, 77) = 1.89, p = .16, η2 = .05; F(2, 77) = 1.77, p = .18, η2 = .04). Consequently, 
this issue will not be discussed further in this paper.
Asians tend to show lower control beliefs than Westerners (Evans, 1981; Na & Lof-
tus, 1998) and the concepts of control and free will are mutually related, belief in free 
will might be weaker in East Asia. In contrast, the cross cultural research on correspon-
dence bias has demonstrated that East Asians, as well as Westerners, are likely to ex-
plain behaviors in terms of internal traits rather than external constraints (Choi, Nisbett, 
& Norenzayan, 1999; Miyamoto & Kitayama, 2002). This indicates that East Asians 
also have strong free will beliefs because free will is the ability to make choices without 
external constraints. All in all, the studies suggest that East Asians believe in free will 
though their beliefs might be weaker than those of Westerners.
Still, since East Asians generally endorse the existence of free will, disbelief in free 
will might have the same inhibiting effect on self-control in East Asians. Indeed, the re-
sults of Zhao, Liu, Zhang, Shi and Huang (2014) support this argument. They conduct-
ed experiments involving Chinese people and examined the effects of disbelief in free 
will on prejudice. The results indicated that participants in the determinism condition 
reported stronger racial bias than those in the free will condition. Thus, disbelief in free 
will could reduce willingness to exert self-control, leading to enhanced racial prejudice. 
However, the study fails to draw a distinction of effects between belief and disbelief in 
free will because there was no control condition. Therefore, one could not determine if 
disbelief in free will reduced the willingness to exert self-control or the belief in free 
will increase the willingness to exert it. In fact, Zhao et al. (2014) interpreted their find-
ings from the point of the effects of belief in free will, and the cultural universality re-
garding the effect of disbelief in free will is unwarranted.
Thus we attempt to test the generalizability of the effects of disbelief in free will on 
self-control in research involving Japanese participants. Specifically, we ask participants 
the likelihood and desirability of overriding impulsive decisions (the self-control mea-
sure) and compare them in three conditions (free will, determinism, or control). Our 
prediction is that participants in the determinism condition would report less likelihood 
and desirability of overriding the impulsive decision compared to those in the free will 
and control conditions.
Method
Participants and Procedure
Participants were 80 Japanese undergraduates at the University of Tokyo (48 men, 
32 women, Mage = 21.03 years, SD = 1.17). We included free will manipulation as an 
independent variable, and participants were randomly assigned to one of the three con-
ditions (free will, control, or determinism). Dependent variables were participants’ pos-
itive and negative affect reactions after the free will manipulation, and rational decisions 
in a hypothetical scenario as the measure of self-control. The experiment involved, in 
the following order, the free will manipulation, the positive and negative affect mea-
sures, and the self-control measure.
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self-control (e.g., Baumeister et al., 2009; Vohs & Schooler, 2008), this study replicated 
the findings with Japanese people. Thus, it could be concluded that the effect of disbe-
lief in free will is generalized across cultures.
Effects of Belief in Free Will
 In the present research, inducing disbelief in free will reduced the motivation of 
self-control compared with the control condition. In contrast, inducing belief in free will 
did not enhance motivation of self-control. This overall pattern of results generally rep-
licated previous findings in which the induced belief in free will has the same results as 
the control condition. As discussed in the introduction, belief in free will seems to be 
endorsed by most people (Laurene et al., 2011; Paulhus & Carey, 2011; Rakos et al., 
2008), so people’s free will beliefs and their judgments do not radically change under 
the manipulation of inducing belief in free will. Although East Asians might have some-
what weaker belief in free will than Westerners (Evans, 1981; Choi et al., 1999; Miya-
moto & Kitayama, 2002; Na & Loftus, 1998), previous findings conducted in Western 
countries seem to be apply to East Asians as well. In the light of our findings, findings 
of studies involving Chinese samples (Zhao et al., 2014) could be reinterpreted: partici-
pants in the determinism condition displayed stronger prejudice and it is not that partici-
pants in the free will condition showed weaker prejudice.
Limitations
 Caution must be applied as the findings of the present research do not say any-
thing about the existence or nonexistence of free will. Philosophers and scientists have 
been debating for a long time about whether free will actually exists or not (e.g., Kane, 
2011; Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983), and some of them insist that free will is 
an illusion and people cannot help but take determined or random actions (Crick, 1994; 
Wegner, 2002). As far as we can tell, however, it is almost impossible for psychologi-
cal research to answer the question of free will’s existence because it cannot prove the 
possibility of multiple acts or causal effects of intentions. Even though the present study 
does not say anything about the existence or nonexistence of free will, it still contributes 
to the understanding of psychological processes which influence how people react to the 
“no free will” argument. Specifically, if researchers argue that they discovered that there 
is no free will, people would be less likely to exert self-control. As a result, denying the 
existence of free will might have adverse impacts on social judgments and behaviors, 
such as decreasing helping behaviors or increasing aggression. Therefore, future stud-
ies need to replicate and further clarify the link between free will beliefs and people’s 
self-control, such as obtaining empirical data from a different cultural area or a wide age 
range.
Self-control
The mean scores for the self-control measure are presented in Figure1. An ANOVA 
on this measure yielded a significant main effect of free will belief (F(2, 77) = 4.46, p = 
.02, η2 = .10). In order to investigate the nature of this effect further, planned contrasts 
were conducted. Consistent with the hypothesis that disbelief in free will encourages 
impulsive behavior, participants in the determinism condition (M = 3.07; SD = 0.84) re-
ported less self-control than those in the free will condition (M = 3.64; SD = 0.67; t(77) 
= 2.48, p = .02, r = .27) and control condition (M = 3.68; SD = 0.97; t(77) = 2.68, p 
= .01, r = .29). In contrast, the free will condition and control condition did not differ 
from each other in self-control (t(77) = 0.17, p = .86, r = .02).
Figure 1  
Mean self-control scores as a function of free will belief
Discussion
Hypothesis Testing
This study examined the effects of disbelief in free will on self-control. In line with 
our prediction, Japanese participants who were induced to disbelieve in free will re-
ported less likelihood and desirability of overriding the impulsive behavior than those 
whose belief in free will was bolstered or unaltered. This result can be interpreted as 
that disbelief in free will reduces Japanese people’s willingness to exert self-control. If 
people do not believe in free will, they might think that their actions have no options 
and are not caused by their own intentions. Thus people would not be willing to exert 
self-control and would rather act on impulse because they cannot choose intended ac-
tions for desirable behavior. Whereas previous studies conducted in Western countries 
have shown that disbelief in free will alters social judgments and behaviors related to 
Watanabe - 408
self-control (e.g., Baumeister et al., 2009; Vohs & Schooler, 2008), this study replicated 
the findings with Japanese people. Thus, it could be concluded that the effect of disbe-
lief in free will is generalized across cultures.
Effects of Belief in Free Will
 In the present research, inducing disbelief in free will reduced the motivation of 
self-control compared with the control condition. In contrast, inducing belief in free will 
did not enhance motivation of self-control. This overall pattern of results generally rep-
licated previous findings in which the induced belief in free will has the same results as 
the control condition. As discussed in the introduction, belief in free will seems to be 
endorsed by most people (Laurene et al., 2011; Paulhus & Carey, 2011; Rakos et al., 
2008), so people’s free will beliefs and their judgments do not radically change under 
the manipulation of inducing belief in free will. Although East Asians might have some-
what weaker belief in free will than Westerners (Evans, 1981; Choi et al., 1999; Miya-
moto & Kitayama, 2002; Na & Loftus, 1998), previous findings conducted in Western 
countries seem to be apply to East Asians as well. In the light of our findings, findings 
of studies involving Chinese samples (Zhao et al., 2014) could be reinterpreted: partici-
pants in the determinism condition displayed stronger prejudice and it is not that partici-
pants in the free will condition showed weaker prejudice.
Limitations
 Caution must be applied as the findings of the present research do not say any-
thing about the existence or nonexistence of free will. Philosophers and scientists have 
been debating for a long time about whether free will actually exists or not (e.g., Kane, 
2011; Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983), and some of them insist that free will is 
an illusion and people cannot help but take determined or random actions (Crick, 1994; 
Wegner, 2002). As far as we can tell, however, it is almost impossible for psychologi-
cal research to answer the question of free will’s existence because it cannot prove the 
possibility of multiple acts or causal effects of intentions. Even though the present study 
does not say anything about the existence or nonexistence of free will, it still contributes 
to the understanding of psychological processes which influence how people react to the 
“no free will” argument. Specifically, if researchers argue that they discovered that there 
is no free will, people would be less likely to exert self-control. As a result, denying the 
existence of free will might have adverse impacts on social judgments and behaviors, 
such as decreasing helping behaviors or increasing aggression. Therefore, future stud-
ies need to replicate and further clarify the link between free will beliefs and people’s 
self-control, such as obtaining empirical data from a different cultural area or a wide age 
range.
Self-control
The mean scores for the self-control measure are presented in Figure1. An ANOVA 
on this measure yielded a significant main effect of free will belief (F(2, 77) = 4.46, p = 
.02, η2 = .10). In order to investigate the nature of this effect further, planned contrasts 
were conducted. Consistent with the hypothesis that disbelief in free will encourages 
impulsive behavior, participants in the determinism condition (M = 3.07; SD = 0.84) re-
ported less self-control than those in the free will condition (M = 3.64; SD = 0.67; t(77) 
= 2.48, p = .02, r = .27) and control condition (M = 3.68; SD = 0.97; t(77) = 2.68, p 
= .01, r = .29). In contrast, the free will condition and control condition did not differ 
from each other in self-control (t(77) = 0.17, p = .86, r = .02).
Figure 1  
Mean self-control scores as a function of free will belief
Discussion
Hypothesis Testing
This study examined the effects of disbelief in free will on self-control. In line with 
our prediction, Japanese participants who were induced to disbelieve in free will re-
ported less likelihood and desirability of overriding the impulsive behavior than those 
whose belief in free will was bolstered or unaltered. This result can be interpreted as 
that disbelief in free will reduces Japanese people’s willingness to exert self-control. If 
people do not believe in free will, they might think that their actions have no options 
and are not caused by their own intentions. Thus people would not be willing to exert 
self-control and would rather act on impulse because they cannot choose intended ac-
tions for desirable behavior. Whereas previous studies conducted in Western countries 
have shown that disbelief in free will alters social judgments and behaviors related to 
Watanabe - 409References
Baumeister, R. F., Masicampo, E. J., & DeWall, C. N. (2009). Prosocial benefits of feeling free: Disbelief in 
free will increases aggression and reduces helpfulness. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 35, 260–
268.
Choi, I., Nisbett, R. E., & Norenzayan, A. (1999). Causal attribution across cultures: Variation and universality. 
Psychological Bulletin, 125, 47–63.
Crick, F. (1994). The astonishing hypothesis: The scientific search for the soul. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Dennett, D. C. (2003). Freedom evolves. New York: Viking.
Evans, H. M. (1981). Internal-external locus of control and word association: Research with Japanese and 
American students. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 12, 372–382.
Haggard, P., Mele, A., O’Connor, T., & Vohs, K.D. (2010). Lexicon of key terms. Retrieved from http://www.
freewillandscience.com/FW_Lexicon.doc
Kane, R. (2005). A contemporary introduction to free will. New York: Oxford University Press.
Kane, R. (2011). The Oxford handbook of free will (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Laurene, K. R., Rakos, R. F., Tisak, M. S., Robichaud, A. L., & Horvath, M. (2011). Perception of free will: 
The perspective of incarcerated adolescent and adult offenders. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2, 723–
740.
Libet, B., Gleason, C. A., Wright, E. W., & Pearl, D. K. (1983). Time of conscious intention to act in relation 
to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential): The unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act. Brain, 
106, 623–642.
Miyamoto, Y., & Kitayama, S. (2002). Cultural variation in correspondence bias: The critical role of attitude 
diagnosticity of socially constrained behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 1239–1248.
Monroe, A. E., & Malle, B. F. (2010). From uncaused will to conscious choice: The need to study, not speculate 
about people’s folk concept of free will. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1, 211–224.
Mountain. (2013). In Wikipedia. Retrieved 09:53, June 7, 2013, from http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title
=Mountain&oldid=558654837
Na, E. Y., & Loftus, E. F. (1998). Attitudes toward law and prisoners, conservative authoritarianism, attribution, 
and internal-external locus of control: Korean and American law students and undergraduates. Journal of 
Cross-Cultural Psychology, 29, 595–615.
Paulhus, D. L., & Carey, J. M. (2011). The FAD-Plus: Measuring lay beliefs regarding free will and related 
constructs. Journal of Personality Assessment, 93, 96–104.
Rakos, R. F., Laurene, K. R., Skala, S., & Slane, S. (2008). Belief in free will: Measurement and 
conceptualization innovations. Behavior and Social Issues, 17, 20–39.
Sato, A., & Yasuda, A. (2001). Development of the Japanese version of Positive and Negative Affect Schedule 
(PANAS) scales. The Japanese Journal of Personality, 9, 138–139 (in Japanese).
Vohs, K. D., & Schooler, J. W. (2008). The value of believing in free will: Encouraging a belief in determinism 
increases cheating. Psychological Science, 19, 49–54.
Wegner, D. M. (2002). The illusion of conscious will. MA: MIT press.
Zhao, X., Liu, L., Zhang, X. X., Shi, J. X., & Huang, Z. W. (2014). The effect of belief in free will on preju-
dice. PLoS ONE, 9, e91572.
Watanabe - 409References
Baumeister, R. F., Masicampo, E. J., & DeWall, C. N. (2009). Prosocial benefits of feeling free: Disbelief in 
free will increases aggression and reduces helpfulness. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 35, 260–
268.
Choi, I., Nisbett, R. E., & Norenzayan, A. (1999). Causal attribution across cultures: Variation and universality. 
Psychological Bulletin, 125, 47–63.
Crick, F. (1994). The astonishing hypothesis: The scientific search for the soul. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Dennett, D. C. (2003). Freedom evolves. New York: Viking.
Evans, H. M. (1981). Internal-external locus of control and word association: Research with Japanese and 
American students. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 12, 372–382.
Haggard, P., Mele, A., O’Connor, T., & Vohs, K.D. (2010). Lexicon of key terms. Retrieved from http://www.
freewillandscience.com/FW_Lexicon.doc
Kane, R. (2005). A contemporary introduction to free will. New York: Oxford University Press.
Kane, R. (2011). The Oxford handbook of free will (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Laurene, K. R., Rakos, R. F., Tisak, M. S., Robichaud, A. L., & Horvath, M. (2011). Perception of free will: 
The perspective of incarcerated adolescent and adult offenders. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2, 723–
740.
Libet, B., Gleason, C. A., Wright, E. W., & Pearl, D. K. (1983). Time of conscious intention to act in relation 
to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential): The unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act. Brain, 
106, 623–642.
Miyamoto, Y., & Kitayama, S. (2002). Cultural variation in correspondence bias: The critical role of attitude 
diagnosticity of socially constrained behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 1239–1248.
Monroe, A. E., & Malle, B. F. (2010). From uncaused will to conscious choice: The need to study, not speculate 
about people’s folk concept of free will. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1, 211–224.
Mountain. (2013). In Wikipedia. Retrieved 09:53, June 7, 2013, from http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title
=Mountain&oldid=558654837
Na, E. Y., & Loftus, E. F. (1998). Attitudes toward law and prisoners, conservative authoritarianism, attribution, 
and internal-external locus of control: Korean and American law students and undergraduates. Journal of 
Cross-Cultural Psychology, 29, 595–615.
Paulhus, D. L., & Carey, J. M. (2011). The FAD-Plus: Measuring lay beliefs regarding free will and related 
constructs. Journal of Personality Assessment, 93, 96–104.
Rakos, R. F., Laurene, K. R., Skala, S., & Slane, S. (2008). Belief in free will: Measurement and 
conceptualization innovations. Behavior and Social Issues, 17, 20–39.
Sato, A., & Yasuda, A. (2001). Development of the Japanese version of Positive and Negative Affect Schedule 
(PANAS) scales. The Japanese Journal of Personality, 9, 138–139 (in Japanese).
Vohs, K. D., & Schooler, J. W. (2008). The value of believing in free will: Encouraging a belief in determinism 
increases cheating. Psychological Science, 19, 49–54.
Wegner, D. M. (2002). The illusion of conscious will. MA: MIT press.
Zhao, X., Liu, L., Zhang, X. X., Shi, J. X., & Huang, Z. W. (2014). The effect of belief in free will on preju-
dice. PLoS ONE, 9, e91572.
